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ABSTRACT 
 
Distributed electronic auctions are increasingly preferred over centralized electronic 
auctions today. The success of peer-to-peer file sharing networks has made distributed 
electronic auctions a possibility. Due to trust and conflict of interest issues with centralized 
auctioneer systems, multiple auctioneers in distributed roles are preferred. However, there is 
a possibility of auctioneer node collusion [16] and auctioneer-bidder collusion and 
auctioneer-seller collusion in such mechanisms.   
To overcome these problems, a new peer-to-peer auction protocol [17] with auctioneers 
forming auctioneer groups has been proposed. This protocol keeps the auctioneers honest 
by ensuring that no single auctioneer in the group has absolute control over the auction 
process. But, it leads to multiple bid comparisons and thus increases redundancy. It also fails 
to enforce a secure bid comparison method and hence fails to provide privacy of bids. This 
thesis presents a modified version of this protocol where the oblivious transfer method [14] 
is used to solve the Yao millionaires’ problem [22] that arises between two auctioneer groups 
when they have to compare bids. Additionally, a 2nd price mechanism in which only the 
second highest bid is known to all the auctioneer groups except for the auctioneer group 
which holds the highest bid, ensures that no unnecessary bid comparisons are made between 
auctioneer groups. Hence, the result is an efficient auction protocol which is iterative, 
asynchronous, 2nd price and based on a peer to peer mechanism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Auctions are one of the leading mechanisms today used for buying and selling goods 
which do not have a fixed price or value. Auctions have progressed from the ancient 
English, 1st price sealed bid, Vickery and Dutch auction mechanisms, to the modern 
electronic or internet version employed by Ebay, Amazon, etc.  
Even though these internet auctions are quite popular, the protocols struggle to import 
all the advantages of the traditional auctions while providing modern advantages like 
asynchronous bidding, iterative bids and proxy bidding. Moreover, the disadvantages of the 
traditional auction mechanisms like bidder collusion and malicious auctioneers provide a 
constant challenge to electronic auction protocols. Hence, we need to realize an auction 
protocol which will integrate all the advantages of modern and traditional auction 
mechanisms while also being secure and efficient.  
1.1 Motivation 
The auction setup which Ebay employs basically includes a central server or a group of 
servers that handles all the incoming bids from the proxy agents and does the necessary 
processing of the bids that are received. Hence, there is only one central auctioneer who 
conducts the entire auction. This system is dependent on the functional and ethical reliability 
of the central server. A denial of service attack on the central server or a mere crashing of 
the server could potentially affect the outcome of all current auctions.  Additionally, a 
malicious party, who may or may not be the bidder or seller, could get control of the central 
server and affect the outcome of all current auctions.  Finally, the system requires all the 
bidders to trust the administrators of the central server, but when the administrators are paid 
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based on the final selling price, a conflict-of-interest is present, and user’s trust can be easily 
betrayed if the auctioneer creates fictitious bidders or colludes with one or more sellers or  
bidders. Although the trusted, centralized auctioneer provides a simple system that decreases 
overhead, the number of disadvantages far surpasses the advantages.  
This leads us to the logical conclusion that trust in the central server must be reduced. 
This can be achieved by splitting the central server into many independent peers. Hence, a 
single auctioneer is now replaced by multiple auctioneers who will combine together to 
perform the duties of the single auctioneer. This method helps in removing the 
disadvantages posed by the centralized auction method. The latest protocol for distributed 
auctions proposed by Rolli et al [17] provides a distributed mechanism for ascending second 
price auctions, but it requires multiple bid iterations, which increases overhead. Also, the bid 
comparisons are not done in a secure manner, and hence, the intermediate highest bids are 
not anonymous. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to effectively implement the distributed 
approach more efficiently while maintaining the anonymous nature of intermediate highest 
bids. 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
This thesis recognizes the bid comparison to be done between auctioneer groups as a 
Yao Millionaires problem [22] and solves it using oblivious transfer [14] to ensure secure bid 
comparison. It also implements second price intermediate higher bid comparison to decrease 
the bid iteration and improve efficiency.  
The result is that an arbitrary precision can be achieved in a secure protocol which does 
not reveal the highest price at any time during the auction. 
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 1 gives the motivation and the thesis overview. 
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to auctions. It gives a brief history of auctions and 
defines the different types of auctions that have been used through history. It also defines 
the various parameters which have to be fulfilled to design the ideal auction protocol. 
Chapter 3 talks about the related work done in the field of distributed secure auctions. It 
focuses on the different auction protocols, their advantages and disadvantages based on the 
parameters set in chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 discusses the modified auction protocol, the theory behind its proposal and 
the security analysis of the proposed protocol.  
Chapter 5 talks about the implementation of the auction protocol. Its compares the 
results obtained with the results from an auction that does not use Yao oblivious transfer for 
bid comparisons. It also highlights the important conclusions that can be made after 
analyzing the auction protocol and discusses the future work that can be done to improve 
the performance of the proposed auction protocol. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS 
 
 
Auctions are one of the leading mechanisms in the world of electronic commerce today. 
Auctions are used for buying and selling goods varying from cattle and food grains, to 
electronics. So popular is the method that it is even used by the government to sell radio 
frequency spectrum licenses. In today’s world with the emergence of the internet, 
“electronic” or “internet” auctions have become an effective means to buy and sell new and 
used goods. As of February 2007 the total dollar value of merchandise sold in auctions is 
about $14.28 billion. 
2.1  What is an Auction? 
The word auction is derived from the Latin word “augere” which means “to increase”. 
Thus, an auction is the process of buying and selling things by 
a. Offering them up for Bidding. 
b. Taking Bids. 
c. Selling the item to the highest Bidder. 
The common terminologies used for describing an auction and during the process of an 
auction are as follows: 
a. Auctioneer: The auctioneer is the authority that performs the auction. Auctioneers are 
usually trained for their role and know the legal and practical aspects of conducting the 
auction. Sometimes it is required for the auctioneer to be licensed and bonded to conduct an 
auction.  
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b. Seller: The seller is the person who wants to sell an item owned by him using the 
auction mechanism. Generally, the seller is a person who is registered with the auction house 
and is known to all the potential buyers who will bid for the item being sold. 
c. Bidder: A bidder is the person who offers an amount of money for the item being sold 
at a particular auction session. 
2.2 History of Auctions 
The earliest auctions have been known to have been conducted in Babylon in the year 
500 B.C in which marriageable women would be sold on the condition of marriage. Beautiful 
women would fetch higher bids while less beautiful women would have to pay a dowry to be 
accepted into the auction. Thus, the bidding price would be negative which means that the 
bidders would receive money for marrying such women. Auctions can also be dated back to 
the Romans in the year 193 A.D in which literally the entire Roman Empire was on auction.  
A few hundred years down the line in Great Britain the most prominent and classic 
auction houses emerged in the form of Sotheby’s, Christie’s and Bonham’s in 1744, 1766 
and 1793, respectively. In America, auctions were used to sell second hand goods, domestic 
animals and slaves. Also, in the nineteenth century auctions were used to sell vegetables, 
fruits and flowers in Holland and fish in Germany.  
Today with the emergence of the internet there has been a rising amount of users who 
use electronic auctions (see section 2.4). Auction sites such as eBay, Amazon and 
GoIndustry.com are popular alternatives for people who want to trade goods over the 
internet.  
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2.3  Traditional Auction Types 
The auctions mechanisms have evolved over time to incorporate maximum security 
while also adjusting to the markets conditions of particular countries. As seen in the sections 
below the auctions mechanisms have made some typical contributions to the modern world 
of electronic auctions. The difference between the traditional auction types have been 
summarized in the Table 2.1. 
2.3.1  English Auction 
In an English auction the participants bid openly against each other with each bid being 
higher than the previous bid. Initially the seller sets a minimum price for the item being sold. 
If any bidder fails to bid an amount which is equal or higher than the minimum price set 
then the item remains unsold. The auction ends when no participant is willing to place a 
higher bid or the predetermined buy-out price is reached. This type of auction is used in 
English auction houses like Sotheby’s, Christie’s and Phillips. It is also known as the 
“ascending open-cry” auction. 
 
Table 2.1 Traditional Auction Types 
 
 
 
Auction Type 
=> 
English First-Price Sealed 
Bid 
Vickery Dutch 
Bidding 
Type 
Iterative, Public Single, Secret Single, Secret Iterative, 
Public 
Winning Bid Highest Bid Highest Bid Second 
Highest Bid 
When 
Bidding 
stops 
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2.3.2 1st-Price Sealed Bid Auction 
 In a 1st price sealed bid auction, all the bidders simultaneously submit a single sealed bid 
for the item. The highest bidder wins the auction and pays the amount he bid. It is also 
known as “Sealed High-Bid” auction. 
2.3.3 Vickery Auction 
The Vickery auction was proposed by Nobel Prize Laureate William S. Vickery in 1961 
[21]. It is also known as “Sealed Bid 2nd price” auction. It works in a similar manner to 1st 
price sealed bid auction except that the winning bidder pays the 2nd highest bid rather than 
his own.  
2.3.4 Dutch Auction 
In the Dutch auction the auctioneer starts with a high price and decreases the price until 
a bidder is willing to pay the amount or until the predetermined minimum is reached upon 
which the good is not sold. The name comes from the selling of Dutch flowers where an 
electronic buzzer connected to a clock is used to implement the auction. These auctions are 
suitable for selling perishable items which lose their value during the course of the auction. 
Some forms of the Dutch auction were used to sell clothes in USA. 
2.4 Electronic Auctions 
Ebay [6] is one of the most popular electronic auction sites on the internet today. As of 
February 2007, the number of auction listings shows a figure of 588 million. Also, the total 
dollar value of merchandise sold in the auctions is about $14.28 billion. The majority of the 
internet auction sites have auction mechanisms that are roughly based on the traditional 
English auction mechanism. But due to its electronic nature the bidding is done via “proxy 
agents” which submit increasing bids on behalf of the actual bidder. Hence, the bidder does 
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not have to be online all the time especially since a particular auction session can go on for 
many days.  
2.5 Requirements for the ideal auction protocol 
An auction protocol can be considered as an ideal auction protocol if it fulfills certain 
requirements. These requirements [17] have been identified by Rolli et al based on the role 
that the auctioneer plays and the bidding process itself. 
2.5.1 Auctioneer Requirements 
The auctioneer needs to fulfill the following requirements 
a. Second-price 
Second-price auctions are generally preferred over first-price auctions. This is because in 
first-price auctions multiple bidders can collude in such a way that all the bidders bid 
substantially smaller amounts such that the highest bidder can win the auction at a much 
smaller price than he would have to pay. After winning the auction the highest bidder can 
share his savings with the colluding bidders. This situation is eliminated in second-price 
auctions. This is because the highest bidder has to bid his true evaluation of the product and 
the colluding bidders cannot decrease their evaluation and obtain the good without making a 
loss. Hence, second-price auctions have been said to be “self-enforcing” [16]. Hence, the 
auctioneers participating in the auction will jointly determine the final price which will be the 
second highest bid amount plus an increment [17].  
b. Secret highest bid and identity of  bidder 
The identity of the highest bidder and his bid should remain secret at any moment in the 
auction. If the current bid is above the minimum bid for the particular good then it could 
potentially be the highest bid. Hence, even if a particular bidder highest bid is revealed to an 
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auctioneer no other bidder should know if it’s the highest bid. This information should 
remain only with the participating auctioneers. 
c. Resistant to bidder exclusion 
Bidders that have registered for the auction should be able to participate in the auction at 
all times. No auctioneer or group of auctioneers should have the power to illegally drop any 
bidder from the auction or drop and bid from the bidder.  
d. Robust to paralysis attacks 
The auction could involve one or multiple auctioneers. Hence it is possible that a few 
auctioneers could go offline due to problems like denial of service attacks, servers crashing, 
natural calamity or too much traffic and paralyze the entire auction. But, the auction 
protocol should be able to withstand such loss of auctioneers and be able to function 
properly despite this loss. Also, the protocol should be able to withstand any kind of 
deliberate blocking done by a single auctioneer or a group of auctioneers.  
 
2.5.2 Bidding Process Requirements 
The Bidding process needs to fulfill the following requirements 
a. Spontaneous bidder entry and exit 
The auction protocol should be able to add bidders to the auction as and when the 
bidders want to join. Hence, the protocol should give unrestricted access to the new bidders 
joining the auction and accept bids being put up by them without affecting the auction 
process itself. Also, the bidders should be allowed to exit the auction as and when they feel 
like.  
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b. Iterative 
The final result of the auction should be decided over several iterations where bidders 
put several bids, before the time limit or maximum amount limit and get sufficient feedback 
of the progress of the auction. 
c. Asynchronous Bids 
Bidders should be permitted to submit bids at any time during the auction. This helps 
the bidder as he does not have to be online during the entire auction. The bidder should be 
able to put in his group of bids and stay offline till the result is decided. Hence, the protocol 
should be able to achieve a system similar to “proxy bidding”. 
d. Single Independent key-pair 
Each bidder should need only one pair of keys for the entire auction. Thus, each bidder 
should have a public and a private key that is generated before or during the auction process. 
This key-pair should be reusable and should be based on modern cryptographic techniques.  
e. Non-repudiation 
Every bid should be accountable. It should not happen that a bidder wins an auction and 
disputes his own bid. This can be achieved by authenticating every bid submitted by each 
bidder. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RELATED WORK 
 
 
3.1 Early Distributed Auctions  
The Vickery [21] auction or second-price auction format is considered as the ideal 
auction format. While this works well for sealed bid auctions it has some disadvantages when 
implemented in iterative auctions. The disadvantages include the vulnerability against a 
malicious auctioneer [18] and the reluctance of bidders to truthfully reveal their private 
information [14]. These problems are addressed by Brandt [3] in his work on a secret sharing 
scheme which does not have any auctioneers, but it enables bidders to jointly compute the 
final price. It is one of the first methods that look at distributing the role of the single 
auctioneer, which in this case is done by the bidders themselves. But, since this mechanism 
looks into selling M identical items on a non-iterative basis the desired iterative requirement 
is not fulfilled. Franklin and Reiter [7] also proposed a sealed bid mechanism which was 
based on distributed auctioneers using verifiable signature-sharing. But, the protocol cannot 
be extended to iterative bidding. Also, at the end of the auction all the bids are known to all 
the auctioneers.  
Brandt [4] later proposed an iterative adaptation to his previous approach. But since the 
protocol uses round-wise bidding it fails the requirement for the bids to be asynchronous. 
Also, since the bidders do all the computation they have to stay online for the duration of 
the auction. This could cause a major problem on the internet as the bandwidth of bidder 
peers, which is not necessarily large, could slow down the auction since the each bidder has 
to wait for the previous bidder to submit his bid.  
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Kikuchi [13] developed an electronic auction with distributed auctioneers, which is based 
on multiparty secret computation. But, it faces the problem that it requires a threshold 
number of obedient auctioneers to perform the auction. If the number of obedient 
auctioneers goes below this threshold value the auction can be compromised.  
Other methods include those which have a partially trusted third party. Cachin [5] 
proposed a method in which the third party or auctioneer is totally oblivious to the bidding 
amounts and only does the computation on the bids using cryptographic means. He 
introduces the outstanding problem called “Millionaires Problem” [22] in which two 
millionaires want to know who is richer without revealing their riches to each other. It 
provides bid privacy as in the final bid and the identity of the winner is not revealed. But, the 
problem again arises in that it supports only sealed bid format and not the iterative format. 
Also, having a partially trusted third party is similar to the concept of having a centralized 
auctioneer which is like “Putting the fox in charge of the hen house” [19].  
3.2  An asynchronous and secure ascending peer-to-peer auction [17] 
Rolli et al [17] proposed a distributed mechanism for ascending second price auctions. 
The method includes an auction setup in which the seller initiates the auction and selects the 
auctioneers using addressing mechanisms in structured peer-to-peer networks like CAN [19] 
and Chord [20] thus ensuring randomness in the selection of auctioneers and subsequent 
auctioneer groups. A detailed explanation of the setup process is given in the Section 3.2.1.  
3.2.1  Auction Entities 
The auction consists of three different types of entities namely seller, bidder and 
auctioneer. Before the auction is setup these entities will be nothing but simple peers or 
nodes in the network. Hence, these peers will be spread throughout the network before the 
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auction. The different entities will perform different roles and therefore have different 
requirements. The seller only needs to initiate the auction and hence has to only 
communicate with the potential auctioneer nodes. Hence, the seller node does not need to 
have a very high capacity or constant connectivity. Similarly, the bidder nodes only need to 
register in the auction and prepare their bids and submit them. Hence, they do not need to 
exchange any kind of data or do any computation on data. Hence, the bidder nodes also 
need not have a very high capacity or constant connectivity. But, the auctioneer nodes need 
to communicate between each other and exchange data between them during the course of 
the auction. They need to be constantly online and hence need a constant connectivity with a 
high capacity to securely exchange data between each other. Hence, such nodes need to be 
similar to super-nodes [12]. Fig 3.1 shows the transformation of simple peers before the 
auction setup to the auction entities after the auction is setup. 
 
Figure 3.1 Auction entities [17] 
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3.2.2  Auction Initialization 
As the auction does not intend to include any auction authority, the auction initialization 
is done by the seller himself. The seller creates the auction document D. This document has 
all information about the auction including the description of the items for sale, the 
particular auction type that will be used and the starting price of the auction.  
The next important step in the auction initialization process is the distribution of the 
auctioneers into groups. This also has to be done by the seller. The following calculation is 
used to determine this distribution of auctioneers 
Gsize = [logx (Atotal)] 
Gnumber = [
Gsize
Atotal
] 
where, Atotal – The total number of auctioneers participating in the auction.  
       Gsize – The size of an auctioneer group.    
        Gnumber – The number of auctioneer groups in the auction.  
The process of selection of the auctioneers is shown in the Fig 3.2. Initially the seller has 
knowledge of the available auctioneer nodes. The seller sends a participation broadcast to all 
the auctioneer nodes. Each auctioneer node acknowledges its participation in the auction by 
sending the hash value associated with the location or address of the node. Since, the 
selection of auctioneers into groups is done by the seller himself, it is possible that the seller 
can select collaborating or malicious nodes in the auctioneer groups. To avoid such a 
situation the hash value is used which is mapped to the location of the nodes using 
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mechanisms that are used in structured peer-to-peer networks like CAN [15] and Chord [20]. 
The address of a particular auctioneer can be found using the following formula: 
Address(Aij) = Hi.Gsize+j (D)  where 0 ≤ i < Gnumber  
    and 0 ≤ j < Gsize                   ….(1)   
A random function is used to distribute these hash values into groups, and hence, the 
seller effectively distributes the auctioneer nodes into auctioneer groups without any 
knowledge of the actual location or address of the nodes. A few bits in the hash value can 
also be dedicated to the location of auctioneer nodes based on continent or region such that 
the auctioneer groups selected have maximum physical separation. After the selection of the 
auctioneer groups the auction document D is modified with information of the auctioneer 
groups and sent over to all the participating auctioneer nodes.  
After the formation of auctioneer groups, the auctioneers within a group communicate 
between each other and generate a common group public/private key pair. This key pair can 
be generated by one auctioneer within the group and sent to the other auctioneers, or a 
distributed key pair [1] can also be generated among the auctioneers.  
Hence, at the end of the auction setup we have the following information: 
Gi – Group i of auctioneers, where 0 ≤ i < Gnumber  , 
Ki – Public key of auctioneer group Gi , and 
Aij – Auctioneer j of group i, where 0 ≤ i < Gsize . 
 
 16 
     
Figure 3.2 Auction setup process 
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3.2.3 Bidders joining the auction 
In order to enter the auction a potential buyer has to procure the auction document D. 
The seller will setup a web server to advertise the auction. Potential buyers can visit the web 
server and obtain information about the product being auctioned. If the buyers are 
interested they will download the document D to get further information about the auction. 
The bidder can join the auction by placing a bid. This is done by the bidding process which 
is explained in Section 3.2.4.  
3.2.4 Bidding process 
Once the bidder obtains information of the product which is being sold he prepares a 
valuation v for the product. This value v is his true valuation of the product. The entire 
bidding process is shown in Fig 3.3. At any point in the auction the bidder selects a value p 
such that p < v and p > current bid. He then formulates a series of values which are 
monotonously increasing, up to the value of p. These values form what is known as a bid 
chain BC while the individual values are known as bid steps. To ensure non-repudiation the 
bidder digitally signs each bid.   
The bidder can reproduce the address of any particular participating auctioneer using the 
formula (1) in Section 3.2.2. The bidder then chooses a hopping sequence of auctioneer 
groups H S as defined below: 
H Si = j  where 0 ≤ j < Gnumber   
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Figure 3.3 Bidding process 
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The bidder then fetches the public keys of the auctioneer groups he selects to send his 
bids to. The bidder then encrypts the highest bidding step with the first public key KHS0 of 
the hopping sequence. He then encrypts his second highest bidding step, the hash value of 
the highest bidding step and the encrypted highest bidding step with the second public key 
KHS1 of the hopping sequence. He repeats this procedure until all the bidding steps are 
encrypted and his lowest bid or starting bid is the last encrypted bid as shown below 
 
E Bn = EHS0(SL(Bn))  
E Bn-1 = EHS1 (SL(Bn-1), SL(H(Bn)), E Bn) 
 . . . . . . . . 
E B1 = EHSn-1 (SL(B1), SL(H(B2)), E B2) 
E B0 = SL(H(B1)), E B1  
where  E Bi = Encrypted bid Bi using public key Ki  , 
  SL = Digital signature of bidder L , and  
  H(Bi) = Hash value of the bid Bi . 
Thus, the bidder L will start his bidding process by sending E B0 to the auctioneer group 
which has the key KHSn-1.  Hence, for any auctioneer group to get the next bid step of bidder 
L the previous bid step has to be decrypted by the auctioneer group which receives the 
previous bid step as illustrated in Fig 3.4 and Fig 3.5. 
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Fig 3.4 shows an illustration of multiple layers of encryption used in this protocol. We 
see that the highest bid is encrypted first and later on the lower bids are encrypted which 
resembles the layers of an onion [11]. Hence, out of a total of 4 bids when the first layer of 
encryption is removed it reveals the lowest bid or 4th highest bid of the bidder and when the 
second layer of encryption is removed the 3rd highest bid is revealed. Hence, every layer of 
the onion is a layer of encryption which when removed gives the next highest bid step 
submitted by the bidder.   
 
Encryption Layer
First/Highest Bid Third BidSecond Bid Fourth Bid
 
Figure 3.4 An illustration of multiple layer encryptions 
 
A typical bid chain creation is illustrated in Example 3.1 
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Example 3.1 Consider the Fig 3.5 in which a bidder wants to submit a series of bids in 
ascending order. He wants to start off with an initial bid of $10 and monotonically increase 
to $12, $15 and finally ending at $30 which is his highest bid. Hence, he starts creating his 
bid chain by first encrypting his highest bid i.e. $30 by the public key of the 1st auctioneer 
group from the selected hopping sequence H S. In the next step he encrypts his second 
highest bid and the encrypted first highest bid with the public key of the 2nd auctioneer 
group from the hopping sequence H S and so on. Hence, we have a series of bids 
sandwiched between multiple layers of encryption as shown in Fig 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 An illustration of formation of a bid chain [17] 
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3.2.5 Processing a Bid 
When an auctioneer receives a bid chain E B0 he first checks if their group key is same as 
the encryption key used for encrypting the bid E B1. If this check is successful the bid E B0 
will be propagated to all the members within the group, else it will be forwarded to the 
applicable group. A randomly selected subset of auctioneers will then decrypt the bid E B1 
and the signed bidding step SL(B1) will be propagated to all the members within the group to 
verify the validity of the bid by comparing the hashed value of the bid with the hashed value 
H(B1) which is included in the bid step. This is illustrated in Fig 3.6.  
Once the bid is received the auctioneer group checks if the bid is greater than the 
standing highest bid HB0 .i.e. B1 > HB0 . The value of HB0 is known to all the auctioneer 
groups. But the bidder who has of the standing highest bid is not known to any auctioneer 
groups except for the auctioneer group that received the bid. If the bid B1 is lesser than the 
standing highest bid HB0 the group will transfer SL(B1), SL(H(B2)) and E B2 to the next 
auctioneer group in the hopping sequence. If the bid B1 is greater than the standing highest 
bid HB0 the auctioneer group will convey the auction status to the bidder and broadcast B1 
as the standing highest bid.  
 23 
 
Figure 3.6 Processing a bid 
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This method fulfills most of the requirements for an ideal auction protocol. It supports 
an asynchronous, iterative proxy bidding format and ensures privacy of bids including the 
winning bids and the winning bidders’ identity. But, the protocol does not talk about the 
possibility of deducing the bidders highest evaluation based on the size of the bid chain. 
Also, the system fails to implement the comparison of intermediate bids between auctioneer 
groups in a secure manner. Hence, it is possible that during comparison of the current bid 
and highest bid the auctioneer groups will know the values of the two bids that are being 
compared, and hence, the winning bid will be known to more than one auctioneer group. 
Thus, the protocol fails to ensure complete privacy of the highest bid. If the bid comparison 
is done using secure means it would also lead to many unwanted exchanges between the two 
auctioneer groups for each comparison thus making the protocol highly inefficient. Since, 
the auction protocol uses a first price mechanism during the intermediate bid comparisons, a 
comparison would have to be done between auctioneer groups for every bid that is received 
as shown in the Example 3.2. 
Ex 3.2 Consider the case where there are m=100 auctioneer groups and n=10 bidders. Let 
each bidder put a maximum of k=50 bids in the entire auction. Also, consider that all the 
bids are exhausted to know the outcome. Hence we have the following: 
Total Number of bids in the auction b = n * k = 500 . 
Now suppose the number of handshake exchanges used for the secure comparison is h = 3. 
To do a secure comparison for each bid we will require (b-1) * h = 499 * 3 = 1497 
exchanges between auctioneer groups. Hence, for a million bids the auction the time taken 
for secure exchange will be 3 million. 
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 This would make the protocol highly inefficient. Hence, we need a mechanism which 
will decrease the number of rounds or exchanges done between auctioneer groups during 
the course of the auction.  
The auction protocol proposed in this thesis is based on the method proposed by Rolli 
et al. But, it deviates at the point where the comparison between bids is done in a secure 
manner using cryptography. In particular this thesis successfully implements oblivious 
transfer method [14] between auctioneer groups and solves the “Millionaires problem” [22] 
that arises between the two auctioneer groups. Also, the current highest bid is never declared 
in the auction. For every step the second highest bid amount is made known to all the 
auctioneers. The advantage of this adaptation can be explained with the Example 3.2. 
Example 3.2 Consider the figures from the Example 3.1. Hence, we have 
Total Number of bids in the auction b = n * k = 500 
But now instead of a secure comparison for every bid we only need to do the secure 
comparison if a bid is higher than the standing highest or 2nd highest bid.  
This modification reduces the number of secure comparisons done between the 
auctioneer groups and hence improves efficiency.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AUCTION PROTOCOL WITH YAO OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Systems like Kazaa [12] and GNUtella [8] are working proof of the success of 
decentralized peer to peer systems on the internet today. Now, the existing auction 
mechanisms depend on the centralized auctioneer or auction authority. But such systems 
require the bidders to trust the auctioneer or auction authority. To distribute this trust, 
various distributed auction protocols based on peer to peer mechanism have been proposed. 
This thesis tries to realize an auction protocol that is based on the peer-to-peer mechanism 
and can function without requiring any major memory requirements and provide a high 
efficiency coupled with adequate security. 
4.2 Background 
The protocol proposed in this thesis uses the 2nd price mechanism for comparison of 
bids. When an auctioneer group receives a particular bid it compares the bid to the 2nd 
highest bid of the auction. Since, the 2nd highest bid is the amount which is fairly close to the 
highest bid amount it is fair enough to compare a new bid with it. Hence, only those bids 
which are greater than the 2nd highest bid are subject to secure comparison with the 
auctioneer group that has the highest bid. Hence, the number of rounds of secure 
comparisons is decreased. The auction setup mechanism and bidding mechanism is the same 
as the Rolli et al [17] implementation that can be seen in Section 3.2. The processing of a bid 
varies from the Rolli et al [17] method and is explained in Section 4.2.1. 
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4.3 Protocol Enhancements 
The proposed protocol basically adds the Yao oblivious transfer to compare bids 
between two auctioneer groups without them knowing each others bids. It also uses the  
to ensure privacy of intermediate highest bids.   
4.3.1. Processing a bid 
When an auctioneer receives a bid chain E B0 he first checks if their group key is same as 
the encryption key used for encrypting the bid E B1. If this check is successful the bid E B0 
will be propagated to all the members within the group else it will be forwarded to the 
applicable group. A randomly selected subset of auctioneers will then decrypt the bid E B1 
and the signed bidding step SL(B1) will be propagated to all the members within the group to 
verify the validity of the bid by comparing the hashed value of the bid with the hashed value 
H(B1) which is included in the bid step. This is illustrated in Fig 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 Processing a bid using Yao Oblivious Transfer 
 
Once the bid is received the auctioneer group checks if the bid is greater than the 
standing highest bid StB0 which is also the second highest bid of the auction .i.e. B1 > StB0 . 
The value of StB0 is known to all the auctioneer groups. But the bidder who has of the 
standing highest bid is not known to any auctioneer groups except for the auctioneer group 
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that received the bid. Also, the auctioneer group holding the highest bid is known to all the 
auctioneer groups participating in the auction. If the bid B1 is lesser than the standing 
highest bid StB0 the group will transfer SL(B1), SL(H(B2)) and E B2 to the next auctioneer 
group in the hopping sequence. If the bid B1 is greater than the standing highest bid StB0 the 
auctioneer group initiates a Yao transfer [22] with the auctioneer group that holds the 
highest bid.  
The Yao transfer is used to determine if the current bid B1 is greater than the current 
highest bid HB0. If B1 > HB0 , the auctioneer group will create a confirmation for the bid B1 
and send this confirmation to the bidder L. The auctioneer group will then broadcast the 
value HB0 as the standing highest bid and update its status in the auction as the auctioneer 
group that holds the current highest bid. If B1 < HB0 the group will convey to the bidder 
that the bid is too low. The group will also transfer SL(B1), SL(H(B2)) and E B2 to the next 
auctioneer group in the hopping sequence. The Yao transfer is explained in Section 4.2.1.1. 
4.3.1.1 Yao’s Millionaires’ problem [22] 
Consider two millionaires Alice and Bob. Alice has i millions and Bob has j millions. 
Both want to find out which amount is greater without actually revealing their riches to each 
other. This classic problem is called the Yao’s Millionaires’ problem.  
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The same situation occurs between the auctioneer group that has the highest bid HB0 
and the auctioneer group that has a bid B0 that is greater than the standing highest bid. The 
solution is explained in Section 4.3.1.2. 
 
4.3.1.2 Oblivious transfer [14] 
The solution to the problem mentioned above can be explained in terms of oblivious 
transfer also known as secure computation. Oblivious transfer is also regarded as the “crypto 
gate” for secure computation. It can be illustrated from Fig 4.2 . 
The protocol is as follows: 
1. To initiate the transfer each auctioneer group needs to have a public key and a 
private key. Group A has the bid amount B1 while group B has the current highest 
bid HB0. 
2. Group A chooses a large random number, x and encrypts it with Group B’s public 
key. 
c = Eb(x) 
where, Eb = Group B’s public key 
3.  Group A computes (c- B1) and sends the result to Group B. 
4.   Group B computes the following 100 numbers 
 Yu = Db(c- B1-u),   for 1 ≤ u ≤ 100 
 Db = Decryption algorithm with Group B’s private key. 
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5. Group B chooses a large random prime p and computes the following 100 numbers: 
Zu = (Yu mod p),  for 1≤u≤100 
 
Figure 4.2 Yao Oblivious transfer 
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      6. Group B then verifies that, for all u ≠ v 
| Zu – Zv | ≥ 2   
and that for all u 
 0< Zu <p-1 
If this is not true then group B chooses another prime and tries again. 
7. Group B sends group A this sequence of numbers in this exact order: 
Z1, Z2,…., ZHB0, ZHB0+1 + 1, ZHB0+2 + 1,……, Z100 + 1, p  
8. Group A checks whether the B1
th number in the sequence is congruent to x mod p. 
If it is then group A concludes that B1 > HB0, else B1 ≤ HB0. 
9. Group A tells group B the conclusion. 
Now it is assumed that group A will send the wrong result to the group B. But, the 
creation of bid chains helps in tracing back the group that has cheated. Hence, at any point 
in the auction only the second highest bid is known to all the auctioneers. The Yao transfer 
ensures that the bidder at each point submits his true valuation and hence extends the 
positives of the sealed bid 2nd price auction to an asynchronous, iterative auction. 
4.4 Security Analysis 
The proposed auction protocol fulfills all the requirements for the ideal auction protocol 
(see section 2.5) with respect to the auctioneer and the bidding process as it’s the same as the 
protocol proposed by Rolli et al [17]. But we need to see the security provided by the 
protocol for the secure transfer and comparison of bids. Since, there is no exchange of bid 
amounts from one auctioneer group to another the highest bid amount is not known to the 
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any auctioneer group except the group that receives it. If the result is not truthfully revealed 
by any auctioneer group it can be easily traced back using the bid chain. Also, the chances of 
an auctioneer group not willing to do the Yao transfer is eliminated since the auctioneer 
group has different auctioneers and the Yao comparison can be done with the presence of 
only one faithful auctioneer. Also, the intermediate calculations done during the Yao transfer 
can be verified by the other auctioneers in the group to ensure that the integrity of the Yao 
Oblivious transfer.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter deals with the implementation of the proposed protocol. It gives an 
overview of the architecture that is employed for the implementation and gives an insight 
into JXTA pipes and peergroups and their relevance to the project. It also explains the 
various classes used in the project and gives pseudo code for the implementation. 
 
5.1 Architecture  
The implementation of the protocol is an extension of the implementation realized by 
Rolli et al [17]. Its architecture can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Architecture [17] 
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The implementation is built upon the JXTA 2.3.5 platform. JXTA or Juxtapose [10] is an 
open source technology created by Sun Microsystems in 2001 and is used to create peer-to-
peer (P2P) applications based on Java technology. The various peer nodes i.e. bidder and 
auctioneer peers, participating in the auction communicate with each other using the 
underlying protocols of the JXTA framework. Hence, the important functions of the 
auction, like forwarding bid chains and exchanging messages and auction information is 
done by the peer nodes using the JXTA framework.  
The auction logic is the part that specifies what actions the auction peers should perform 
based on the requirements of the auction protocol. In particular, the bidder logic creates bid 
chains and deals with the encryption and signing of the bids. This is done with the help of 
the routines provided by the Bouncy Castle Crypto API [2]. The auctioneer logic is 
responsible for decrypting the bids that the auctioneer peer receives from the bidder peer. It 
also uses the Bouncy Castle Crypto API for this purpose.  
The implementation also provides a bidder and auctioneer GUI which uses Swing as the 
standard Java GUI framework. The bidder GUI takes in the bids from the bidder that will 
be forwarded to the auction logic module. It also gives a view of the current auction status 
which includes the current number of items sold, unsold items and the current minimum 
bid. The auctioneer GUI on the other hand shows the current standing highest bid and the 
other bids that are lower than it.  
5.2 JXTA tools required for Yao oblivious transfer 
When an auctioneer peer receives a bid that is greater than the standing highest bid it 
needs to compare the bid with the peer that holds the current highest bid.  This comparison 
needs to be done in a secure manner using Yao oblivious transfer as described in section 
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4.2.5.2. We need some mechanism to perform the Yao oblivious transfer between two peers 
in the auction. This is done using the JXTA pipe service.  
5.2.1 JXTA Pipe Service [9] 
Pipes are the core mechanism for exchanging messages between two JXTA peers within 
a JXTA application. JXTA uses input pipes and output pipes for this purpose. These pipes 
provide a unidirectional, asynchronous and virtual communication channel between two 
peers.  
The peer that wants to initiate communication sets up an input pipe and binds it to a 
specific pipe advertisement. The peer then publishes the advertisement so that all the other 
peers that want to communicate with this peer can obtain the advertisement and create 
output pipes such that messages can be sent to the input pipe. Hence, the input pipe is 
referred as “receiving” pipe and the output pipe is referred as “sending” pipe. The pipes can 
function irrespective of the location of the peer, the presence of a firewall or NAT or the 
network to which the peer belongs to. Hence, if one peer belongs to a TCP network and 
another peer belongs to a token ring network, they can still communicate provided that 
JXTA relay peers exist between them.  
Pipes support two different types of communication modes namely point-to-point mode 
and propagate mode.  
5.2.1.1 Point-to-Point Mode 
The point-to-point pipe connects exactly two pipe endpoints. The output pipe at one 
end sends messages and the input pipe at the other end receives messages. No reply message 
or acknowledgement message is supported for this mode.  
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5.2.1.2 Propagate Mode 
The propagate mode connects one output pipe to multiple input pipes. Hence, it is a 
kind of a broadcast mode in which one peer sends a single message to multiple peers. It 
might create multiple copies of the same message to achieve the broadcast.  
5.2.1.3 Pipes and Peergroups 
Pipes and the connectivity of pipes is related to the concept of peergroups. The two 
peers that want to communicate should belong to the same peergroup. Now in JXTA it is 
possible for a peer to be part of two peergroups, where one peergroup presides over the 
other as shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 Pipes and peergroups 
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Now, Peer 1 can either use its point-to-point pipe from the NetPeerGroup or the 
propagate pipes of peergroup A to communicate with peers 2 and 3. Peers 2 and 4 can 
communicate using the peergroup A pipes, while peer 4 can use the broadcast propagate 
pipe to communicate with peers 2 and 3. A peer can maintain different pipe connections 
with the same peer. Hence, Peer 2 can communicate with Peer 1 using both the 
NetPeerGroup context and the peergroup A context. The only difference is that it will 
inherit the security settings for the particular peergroup while transferring messages.  
In the protocol implementation we have the formation of various auctioneer groups with 
two or more auctioneers. Each auctioneer within an auctioneer group needs to communicate 
with every other auctioneer to exchange information like keys, bids, etc. This is possible 
using the propagate pipes which provide one to many communication and point to point 
pipes which provide one to one communication. Also, two auctioneer groups need to 
communicate in order to do Yao oblivious transfer. This is done using the point to point 
pipe. The NetPeerGroup is the peergroup that is used to do this. 
5.3 Yao Oblivious Transfer Implementation 
The algorithm used for the Yao oblivious transfer between two auctioneer groups is 
shown in section 4.2.5.2. The various classes that help in implementing the Yao oblivious 
transfer are shown below. 
5.3.1 Class AuctionStatus 
The auction protocol implements a class AuctionStatus that gives a view of the various 
working parameters of the auction at any instant. The important parameters in the class are 
shown below: 
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BidStep standingHighestBid : The standingHighestBid records the second highest bid of the 
auction. If propagated properly it shows the current second highest bid of the auction.  
int HighestBidHoldingAuctioneerGroupNo : The HighestBidHoldingAuctioneerGroupNo 
records the group number of the auctioneer group that has the current highest bid. Hence, if 
an auctioneer group receives a bid that is greater than the standing highest bid it looks up at 
the current Auctionstatus for the group number of the highest bid holding auctioneer and 
initiates a Yao oblivious transfer between them to determine if the current bid is greater than 
the current highest bid.  
5.3.2 Class AuctioneerpeerImpl 
The AuctioneerpeerImpl class implements the JXTA level functionality for the Yao 
oblivious transfer. It basically implements all the code required for a successful Yao transfer 
using JXTA pipes. This class initializes the input pipe and the output pipe that will be used 
for communication with other peers. It then initializes a peerListener which is used to track 
the changes and progress happening at the upper auction protocol level.It also initializes a 
PipeMsgListener which is explained in the next section.  
5.3.2.1 Interface PipeMsgListener 
The PipeMsgListener interface is the container for Pipe Message events. It is used to 
listen for messages at the JXTA pipe level of the auctioneer peer or peer group. Whenever 
there is a message event on the input pipe of the auctioneer peer, the PipeMsgListener 
captures the message and extracts the data that has been sent. But for the message to be 
extracted the receiving peer needs to know either the string name or the messageID of the 
function used to send the message.  
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5.3.3 Class AuctioneerLogicImplYao 
The AuctioneerLogicImplYao class implements the major part of the auctioneer logic of 
the protocol. The bidchains that are sent to the auctioneer group are decrypted and verified. 
The bid in the bidchain is then compared with the standingHighestBid. If it is greater than 
the standingHighestbid then the Yao comparison is done, else the standingHighestbid is 
modified and the auction status is broadcast to all the participating auctioneer groups. This 
scenario is illustrated in the pseudo code in Figure 5.3: 
For every newbid that is received 
if (newBid.price > doc.startingPrice) 
if (newBid > standingHigestBid) { 
 get the current auctionstatus 
 get auctionstatus.HighestBidHoldingAuctioneerGroupNo 
 Do the Yao transfer with the highest bid holding auctioneer group 
 if (Yao Transfer.newbidisgreater){ 
  update this.HighestBid 
  update auctionstatus.HighestBidHoldingAuctioneerGroupNo 
 } else { 
  update auctionstatus.standingHighestBid = newBid 
  broadcast auctionstatus to all auctioneer groups 
 } 
} 
At the HighestBidHoldingAuctioneerGroup end 
if (Yao Transfer.highestBidhaschanged) { 
 send this.HighestBid to the bidchallenging 
} 
After the transfer and update 
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update auctionstatus.standingHighestBid = this.HighestBid 
broadcast auctionstatus to all auctioneer groups 
Figure 5.3 Pseudo code in class AuctioneerLogicImplYao 
 
5.4 Results 
The major addition to the proposed auction protocol is the Yao oblivious transfer and 
2nd highest intermediate bid mechanism. Since the Yao oblivious transfer contains exchange 
of keys and transfer of information over JXTA pipes, the exchange time is quite high. But 
the introduction of the 2nd highest intermediate bid mechanism will try and decrease the 
amount of time taken for the bid to be processed. In this section we would like to compare 
the precision of the proposed protocol with the Rolli [17] protocol. Fig 5.4 shows a graph 
that compares the variation of bid steps for both the protocols with the time taken for the 
bid step to be created and processed. The bid step for Rolli [17] protocol is increased for 
every iteration while the bid step for the proposed protocol is kept the same. Thus, the 
comparison gives us the point where the two protocols intersect. Since, the time taken for 
bid submission for the proposed protocol is constant at a particular step size it is more 
efficient for higher bid resolution as compared to increasing number of bid steps in the Rolli 
protocol. As seen in the Fig 5.3 the protocols intersect at a step ratio of about 4:1.  
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Figure 5.4 Intersection point for proposed protocol step size = 1 
 
Similarly, Figure 5.5 shows the time taken versus the step size for the proposed 
protocol step size = 2. Hence, for this step size the two protocols intersect at a step ratio 
greater than 7/2 and less than 8/2. Hence, it is proved that the proposed protocol takes 
fewer steps to converge to a result than the Rolli [17] method and hence takes fewer 
iterations.  
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Figure 5.5 Intersection point for proposed protocol step size = 2 
 
5.5 Conclusions and future work 
Hence, an implementation of an asynchronous peer to peer auction protocol with Yao 
oblivious transfer has been realized. The auction protocol has the major properties of being 
iterative, asynchronous and 2nd price. Apart from these properties it is robust, secure and 
exhibits a proxy bidding mechanism. The proposed protocol performs better at smaller bid 
steps than the Rolli [17] protocol. Since, the implementation uses JXTA pipes for the Yao 
oblivious transfer, the bid comparison rates are higher. But, this is mainly due to the slow 
nature of the JXTA pipes. If these bid comparison rates are improved the bid precision 
properties of the protocol can be improved.  
The possible future work on this protocol can be its implementation using pipes that are 
fast, secure and multidirectional which still have to be implemented in JXTA.  
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